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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
rIRGIL REDMOND and ED DeLYLE, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
\'S. 
CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
J. PATION NEELEY, CITY JUDGE, 
WARREN M. WEGGELAND, DEPUTY 
SALT LAKE COUN'rY A TI'ORNEY, 
Defendants-Respondents 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
10340 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Suit for writ of Mandamus to compel Salt Lake City 
Judge to dismiss a criminal complaint against Appellants 
because of failure of Prosecutor to furnish a Bill of 
Particulars ordered by the City Court, or in the alter-
nath·e to order prosecutor to furnish said Bill of Part-
iculars. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
District Court refused to grant relief requested and 
dismissed suit for mandamus with prejudice. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of order dismissin . 
l'v1 d g sun ~ an amus and for an order requiring dismissal .. · 
criminal complaint filed against the Plaintiff of Jt 
C. c . s Ill trt ity ourt, or m the alternati\'e for an order r 
the said Bill of Particulars to be furnished. equini. 
STATEI'v1ENT OF FACTS 
Both Appellants were charged with issuing a fi-
check in a complaint issued by the City Court of s.., 
Lake City. (R 1) 
At their arraignment in the City Court, Appell& 
filed a written motion for a Bill of Particulars. lR J, 18 
The City Judge ordered the prosecution to furnish Ap. 
pellants with documents and other information derilalllll 
in the motion. ( R. 3, 18, 45). The Bill of Particula! 
furnished by the Prosecution is merely a restatemm 
of the allegations of the complaint and a refusal to tum 
the information and documents which the Court ordm! 
to be furnished, except that a copy of the check IDlt 
tioned in the complaint was furnished to Appellants. 
Although the complaint filed in the City Court apilll 
Appellants involves only one check, that check ~ • 
one of a series of forty or fifty checks which BPJS 1 
have been uttered by the same person. (R. 43) All I 
said checks were drawn on the same bank accoun~ • 
made payable to the same persons, bore the same• 
proximate dates, were for approximately the • 
amount, were endorsed by the same person, were Ciiiis 
by use of the same drivers license for identification.• 
part of a numerical sequence, and appear to have-' 
-
3 
.. •m ~hl' saml' pre-numbered check book. (R 51, 52, 53) 
The police appear to ha\'e gathered up all of the checks 
i-:'Ut'n 1:1 th1:- senes. together with the bank signature 
.·,:1.i-. n;in~: n'<.·onis concerning the bank account, retum-
t'': l nt'l'k.- which were deposited to open that bank ac-
', ur.t. and nther documents demanded in the Bill of 
; ':1: t 11 u!ar". The Prosecutor first agreed to furnish Ap-
. 1·'.:.;11b \\·1u1 l·op1es of the requested documents and then 
:·1-:~1-t·d ~,,do so or to permit Appellants to inspect or copy 
-:1.d .Jncuments. 1 R. 52) They have admitted that they 
: .in.' them m their possession. tR. 52, 53) 
B1.,c;1usP the Prosecution has gathered up the evidence 
1w1'tit>d by Appellants to learn the identity of person who 
.·,1shed the checks and needed to submit to hand-writing 
!·xperts to 1dentif~, the persons who actually uttered and 
lashed the checks in question. ( R. 48. 50). the Appellants 
are unable to prepare e\'idence necessary for them to 
present at the preliminary hearing to show that no pro-
;1ble cause exists upon which they could be bound over 
to the District Court for trial. 
Appellants filed in the City Court, a motion to quash 
the complamt in accordance with the provision of 77-11-1 
and 77-23-3. UCA, 1953. or in the alternative to compel 
the Prosecutio11 to furnish the Bill of Particulars ordered 
furnished by the Court. ( R. 12, 13) This motion was 
heard and demed by a different City Judge. Appellants 
then brought this action for a Writ of Mandamus to 
compel the Court to quash the complaint or require the 
Bill of Particulars to be furnished, and the The District 
Court refused to grant the relief requested. From that 
order this appeal is prosecuted. 
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The information sought in the Bill of Particul 
t · f h an~ no a previe~ ~ .t e prosecutions evidence pertaining~ 
the ~Hege~ fictitious check mentioned in the complaint 
but lS evidence and facts which would ordinaril ~ 
available to Appellants but for the act of the prosec~tict 
and the police department in gathering up that evident'! 
so that it is not now available to Appellants. (R 48, 00 
Respondents have admitted in their answer to~ 
complaint filed herein that the order requiring frt 
prosecution to furnish the Bill of Particulars is still ? 
full force and effect and was not overruled by the onie 
of the second Judge which denied Appllants' motion~ 
quash, etc., and Respondents allege that the Bill d 
Particulars furnished by them complied with the orde 
of the Court, notwithstanding the fact that it was mere: 
a refusal to comply with that order. 
POINT I 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN ORD! 
QUASHING THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE OF FAJL 
URE OF PROSECUTION TO FURNISH BILL OF PART· 
ICULARS ORDERED BY THE COURT. 
The City Court ordered the Prosecution to fuml 
the Bill of Particulars demanded by Appellants. The JI 
of Particulars furnished by the Prosecution constitull 
a restatement of the wording of the complaint, a P. 
copy of the check mentioned in that complaint, togedl 
with the following statement in (lieu) of furnishingti 
information demanded in questions 2 and 3 of the*' 
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mand for a Bill of Particulars: 
·Plaintiff refuses to answer questions No. 2 (No. 3) in 
that defendant requests matters which are evidentiary 
and be':ond the scope of a Bill of Particulars." 
Appellants are entitled to the information which they 
Jemanded in their motion for a Bill of Particulars and 
whic.'.l the Court ordered the Prosecution to furnish, as 
;ndicat.ed m 77-21-9, UCA, 1953, (which statute is made 
applicable to complaints by the last paragraph of 77-11-1, 
CCA, 1953, see also State v. Gunn 102 U--422 132 P2d 
109 ( 1942); State v. Solomon 93U70, 71 P2d 104 (1937) 
which statute reads in part as follows: 
''77-21-9, BILL OF PARTICULARS.-(1) When an 
information or indictment charges an offense in 
accordance with the provision of section 77-21-9 but 
fails to inform the defendant of the particulars of 
the offense, sufficiently to enable him to prepare 
his defense, or to give him such information as he is 
entitled under the Constitution of this state, the 
court may, of its own motion, and shall at the request 
of the defendant, order the prosecuting attorney to 
furinsh a bill of particulars containing such itnforma-
tion as may be necessary for these purposes; or the 
prosecuting attorney may of his own motion furnish 
such bill of particulars. 
(2) When the court deems it to be in the interest of 
justice that facts not set out in the information or 
indictment or in any previous Bill of particulars 
should be furnished to the defendant, it may order 
the prosecuting attorney to furnish a bill of par-
ticulars containg such facts. In determining whether 
such facts and, if so, what facts, should be furnished, 
the court shall considered the whole record and the 
entire course of the preceedings against the defend-
ant .... " 
(Emphasis added) 
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It should be noted that the foregoing statute vests in the 
Judge the discretion of determing what "facts" should 
be furnished in a Bill of Particulars in each case, and 
what "particulars" are necessary to enable the accUSed 
to prepare his defense. In addition, when the "interest of 
justice" requires that "facts" available to the Prosecutor 
be furnished to the Defendant the Court may order the 
Bill of Particulars. The statute further sets a standard 
to be used by the Judge in exercising that discretion in 
ordering or refusing to order a given Bill of Particulars. 
State v. Faux, 9 U. 2d 350, 345 P2 186 ( 1959). It is in 
the sound discretion of the Court to determine if the 
accused should be allowed to obtain evidence in the 
possession of the prosecution. State v. Lack, 118 U. 128, 
221 P. 2d 852 (1950). We must assume that in exercising 
its discretion the City Court Judge, who ordered the Bill 
of Particulars, complied with the requirements of 77-21-9, 
UCA, 1953, and, accordingly, that the Prosecution should 
be required to furnish the Bill of Particulars. In dis-
cretionary matters of this type, this Court should not 
substitute its opinion for that the trial Judge unless there 
is a clear abuse of discretion by the lower court. 
Appellants assert that they are innocent of the charges 
contained in the complaint filed in the City Court. It 
cannot be reasonable or rightfully asserted that the 
documents and other information ordered furnished to 
Appellants in the Bill of Particulars is not necessary for 
the preparation of a defense, or that the interest of justice 
does not require that said information be furnished to 
7 
,\ ellants. This information is in fact necessary to learn 
~::identity of persons who can identify the persons who 
actualh- cashed the checks in question and to furnish an 
adequate number of handwriting specimens to a hand-
wnting expert for him to form an opinion as to the 
identity of the person or persons who uttered the checks 
in question. Whenever a person is charged with an 
offense which may result in a fine or imprisonment, 
justice requires that he be given information to show 
his innocence. 
The uncontradicted fact is that the prosecutor wilfully 
refused to comply with the order which required him to 
furnish the Bill of Particulars, which order the pro-
secution admits to still be in full force and effect. (R. 18) 
The remedy available to a Defendant who has not been 
furnished with a sufficient Bill of Particulars when one 
has been ordered is set out in 77-23-3, UCA, 1953 (Which 
statute is made applicable to complaints by the last 
paragraph of 77-11-1, UCA, 77-21-1 1953) and which 
statute was the basis of the motion to quash filed by 
Appellants, which reads in part as follow: 
"77-23-3, MOTION TO QUASH-GROUNDS-A mo-
tion to quash the information or indictment shall be 
available only on one or more of the following 
grounds. In the case of: 
( 1) Either an information or indictment: 
(a) . . . 
(b) That the court has ordered a bill of Particulars 
under the provisions of section 77-21-9 and 
the prosecuting attorney fails to furnish a 
sufficient bill. . . " 
(Emphasis added) 
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Appellants are not seeking an order compelling a Bill 
Particulars. Such an order has been issued in the sound 
discretion of the City Court and is still in full force and 
effect. Appellants motions seeks an order quashing the 
complaint, or in the alternative an order compelling the 
prosecution to comply with the existing order of the 
Court for a Bill of Particulars. The language quoted above 
is quite emphatic concerning quashing of a complaint 
in the event of failure of the prosecution to furnish a 
"sufficient" Bill of Particulars. It is manditory, and the 
Appellants are entitled, as a matter of law, to an order 
quashing the complaint. 
The prosecution admits that it has in its possession 
all of the documents subpoenaed by the Appellants and 
that the documents subpoenaed are the same as those 
demanded in the Bill of Particulars. (R. 52, 53). Because 
they have gathered up all these documents, the Appel. 
lants have no other source from which to obtain them. 
Where information is not otherwise available to an ac-
cused, it is a clear case where justice demands that it be 
furnished so that an adequate defense can be presented. 
POINT II 
REFUSAL TO FURNISH BILL OF PARTICULARS IS 
A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine 
if there is sufficient cause to believe that there has been 
an offense committed and to believe that the accused 
is guilty thereof and accordingly should be held to ansn 
thereto in the District Court. 77-15-17 and 77-15-19, UCA, 
9 
1953
. The accused is entitled to present witnesses and 
e\·idence on his own behalf at a preliminary hearing to 
show that no probable cause exists. 77-15-11, UCA, 1953. 
It would be a useless formality and a denial of due 
rocess of law to hold a preliminary hearing if the accused 
~·ere prevented from presenting evidence and testimony 
on his own behalf to explain the accusations and evidence 
appearing against him. 16 Am. Jur. 2nd, Const. Law., Sec. 
5~8. It would clearly be a denial of due process to require 
the Appellants to be present at a preliminary hearing 
when evidence necessary to prepare their defense has 
been gathered up by the prosecution and withheld so 
that they cannot learn the names of witnesses who might 
testify as to the identity of the real criminals or who 
might testify as to the appellants innocence. If prejudice 
to the preparation of a defense is shown resulting from 
failure to furnish a bill of particulars, the accused who 
has been denied that bill has been denied due process of 
law. Van Dam v. United States, 23 Fed. 2nd 235; (1928) 
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 96 L. ed. 1302, (1952) 
The term "due process of law" is a fundamental 
principal of justice rather than a specific rule of law and 
is not susceptible of more than a general statement of its 
intent and meaning; accordingly, each case must be deter-
mined according to the reasonableness of the action 
taken by the prosecution, the injury to the accused re-
sulting therefrom, and whether it is necessary for the 
information in the possession of the prosecution to be 
disclosed to the accused so that he has an opportunity to 
show that it is untrue. 16 Am .Jur 2nd., Const. Law, Sec. 
340 A 51 C 545, 578. 
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POINT III 
THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE 
SECUTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE IS TO SEEK~ 
TRUTH AND TO ADMINISTER JUSTICE AND NO'" 
SOLELY TO CONVICT. . 
Although the prosecution prepared an instrument 
titled "Bill of Particulars," it was completely insuffict en. 
Furnishing of the checks and other documents ordered~ 
the court was completely refused except for the~ 
check mentioned in the complaint. If the Prosecuti!t 
has a sufficiently strong case to justify prosecution, c 
would not be weakened by discloseure of this evidence. li 
their case is weak and it is necessary to conceal evi-
to present a prima facia case, then the case should not 
have been filed. 
It is well recognized that it in the duty of the pro.. 
secutor in a criminal case to seek justice and to see tba: 
fairness reigns. It is the duty of the state to seek the~ 
rather than to achieve a record of indiscriminate convitim 
by concealment and surprise. A.B.A., Canons of Pro. 
f essional Ethics, Canon 5 
The attorney General of the state of Utah has by statute 
been given the power and duty of supervisory contni 
over county attorneys in the state in their official dutie. 
67-5-1 ( 5) UCA, 1953. In exercising this power the at-
torney general recently (May 21, 1965) issued a~ 
to the Salt Lake County Attorney and others concernq 
disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused. 'nl 
full text of this directive is as follows: 
"To all District Attorneys, County A~ 
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Sheriffs. and Chiefs of Police: 
It was announced this day through the news media 
that an assistant attorney general from this office re-
ported yesterday before the Utah State Council on 
Cnmmal Justice Administration that it would be 
unethical for a defense counsel to approach a police-
man assisting in a prosecution ... that is was a type 
of client-counsel relationship. 
Thls directive is to inform your office of the correct 
position assumed by this office with respect to this 
general area of the law. 
There is absolutely no canon of ethics to prevent 
such contact between policeman and defense counsel. 
There is absolutely no client-counsel relationship 
between policeman and prosecutor. 
The policeman in such a capacity is nothing more 
than a witness. And no prosecutor owns any witness. 
A witness is a person who is to testify as to fa~ 
truthfully-as he has perceived them-no matter 
who calls him as a witness. No honest witness will 
testify that the facts are one way for the prosecution, 
another way for the defense. 
Too often it appears that prosecutors regard them-
selves as partisan attorneys, justified in excluding 
evidence of matters favorable to the accused, and in 
introducing all evidence which could, by any pos-
sibility, be unfavorable to the accused. 
But while a prosecuting attorney is justified in 
bringing out all the facts which tend to establish the 
guilt of the accused, he has no right to misrepresent 
facts or to create false impressions in the mind of the 
jurors. 
Prosecutors represent the people, and should en-
deavor to see, not only that an accused person is con-
victed, but also that the facts are fully and fairly 
placed before the jury. 
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It must be remembered that a fundamentan. 
American concept of the law is that any perso) 
accused of having committed a crime has the con~ 
stitutional presumption of innocence. 
No person is guilty of a crime in this county unti 
he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doublt. i: 
If the prosecutor has sufficient legal evidence to 
prove an accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
what harm to the prosecution could result by ~ 
disclosure of those facts? 
And, if the prosecutor does not have sufficient 
legal evidence to prove an accused guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, he should not prosecute. 
Another constitutional right afforded an accused 
is that he be confronted by his accusers. 
For this right to be meaningful, and not an emptv 
play on words, the defense counsel must be able ~ 
interrogate those accusers and all witnesses with 
factual information before the actual courtroom con-
frontation. Otherwise, the accused might well be 
deprived of a still further constitutional right, that 
of being represented by counsel. For, in any reason-
able fair and logical approach, an unprepared counsel 
is tantamount to no counsel. 
Besides, it is a law in Utah that the accused be 
informed of all witnesses against him. What sense 
would that law make if those witnesses could not 
be interrogated? Absolutely none. So how could 
a defense counsel be unethical by confronting those 
witnesses? 
American justice should not be decided by a game 
of chance, surprise, trickery, gimmick-anything 
short of full disclosure, complete fairness, and im-
partial witness-have no place whatsoever in the 
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rocedural machinery that potentially could deprive ~ne of our citizens of his life or liberty. 
The prosecution has almost every advantage. It 
has its own policemen, investigators, lawyers, ex-
perts, chemist, photographers, d~tors, engineers, 
and unlimited money for preparation. 
An indigent accused has practically none of these 
to use in his defense. Only recenly has Utah had even 
a taste of public approach to this problem. 
A giant step forward has been taken by the form-
ation of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association 
and the appointment of the very capable defense 
lawyer, Jimi Mitsunaga, as its director. 
This trial program, afforded by a grant from the 
Ford Foundation must be supported and given every 
reasonable opportunity to prove its value for con-
tinuation if the State of Utah is to pride itself with 
any sense of fair play toward an accused. 
Toward this end, it is hereby suggested to you and 
the members of your organi~ation by this office, as 
the Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the State of 
Utah and as supervisor of all county attorneys and 
district attorneys, that you adopt the above phil-
osophy by discarding the concept of "cat and Mouse." 
Please make available to all defense counsel the 
names and addresses of all witness of a case known 
to the prosecution, copies of all statements and photo-
graphs, exposure to examination of all physical 
evidence, and any other available factual information 
concerning the case. 
This Directive and Suggested Procedure might 
well seem drastic and severe to the dogmatic adver-
sary of the game "Button, Button, Who's Got the 
Button?" 
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But to the believer in the cherished words of the 
United States Constitution, it is no more than wha, 
has been long overdue. It is no more than complian ' 
with the law. ce 
Surprisingly, perhaps-but inevitable, indeed-such 
a procedure will breed respect for the law, avoid 
crime behind a badge of authority, and aid in the 
reduction of the alarming increase in the crime rate 
of our nation. 
Let us communicate often and be of assistance to 
each other." 
(Emphasis added) 
The trend in the law is definately toward more libera; 
discovery procedure in criminal cases. Permitting a liberal 
discovery will "enhance, rather than diminish, the dignity 
of the administration of law" and is "in accord with 
enlightened administration of criminal justice. U.S. v. 
Peace, 16 F.R.DD 423 (1954). In a recent Utah case this 
Court permitted an accused to inspect the transcript 
of the Grand Jury hearing for purpose of impeachment of 
witnesses at the trial. In that decision the Court stated 
that: 
"the rights of an accused of a crime are in no wise 
to be belittled nor ignored. The fundamental p~ 
of a criminal trial is not solely to convict but to seek 
the truth and adminster justice." State v. Faux, 9 
U. 2d 350, 345 P. 2d 186 (1959) 
The City Court recognized the need of the Appellants 
to secure the documents in question and ordered the 
Bill of Particulars. However, the prosecution without 
a valid reason continues to withhold it. This pol.icy 
certainly is not in accord with the "enlightened rules rl 
criminal justice." 
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CONCLUSION 
The court should reverse the District Court and compel 
the City Court to quash the complaint charging the ap-
pellants with the issuing of a fictious check, or in the 
aJternative to compel the prosecution to furnish the in-
formation which they were ordered to furnished in the 
Bill of Particulars. 
By doing this the interests of justice will be carried 
forth and the Appellants will be able to adequately 
prepare their defense for the presenting of evidence now 
withheld from them in order that they may show lack 
of probable cause at the preliminary hearing. Moreover, 
they will be accorded their constitutional rights by being 
able to present evidence in their favor so that truth might 
be ascertained and justice properly administered. 
Respectfuly submitted, 
Ronald C. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellant& 
